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FS	Functional Safety	Functional Safety Services Example Documents

General EXAMPLE documents		List of Examples		Example refers to
HTML PDF	0418D10SD01 Rev.01 Abbreviations	1	Steam Turbine K-1122	SRS and “SIL verification”
HTML PDF	0418D10SD02 Rev.01 Glossary	2	Letdown Station	SRS and “SIL verification”
PDF	0418D18SD03 Rev.01 SIF General Design Background	3	FMEDA assessment do Actuator-Positioner-Valve arrangement	FMEDA assessment and “SIL Certification”
PDF	0418D20SD04 Rev.01 Safeguarding requirements
PDF	0418H03SD15 Rev.01 Reliability Data Validation

	1	Steam Turbine K-1122
72-SIF-213 – Simplified diagram
		SIF Short description: Steam Turbine K-1122 high speed operation protection
	PDF	0418D30SD05 Rev.02 Conceptual SRS - Steam Turbine
	PDF	0418D30SD06 Rev.02 SIL verification - Steam Turbine (Detailed Report)
	PDF	0418D30SD06-1 Rev.02 SIL verification - Steam Turbine (Short Report)

	2	Letdown Station
60-SIF-500 – Simplified diagram		SIF Short description: Gas Processing Plant inlet facilities protection against an overpressure operation scenario
	NOTE:	This EXAMPLE is an interesting case where just one SRS “Key design statement” change in a SIF design statement, from Case No.1 to No.2, was enough to make the “SIL verification” assessment to DO NOT be the same one for both cases. So, both “SIL verification” assessment RESULTs are different.
	Case No.1	Key design statement: Flow cut-off through one(1) pipe run is successful if at least just one(1) ESV or QSV is closed.
	PFD	0418E20SD07 Rev.02 Conceptual SRS - Letdown Station
	PFD	0418E30SD08 Rev.02 SIL verification assessment & report - Letdown Station (Detailed Report)
	PFD	0418E30SD08-1 Rev.02 SIL verification report - Letdown Station (Short Report)
	Case No.2	Key design statement: Flow cut-off through one(1) pipe run is successful if both ESV and QSV valves are closed.
	PFD	0418E30SD09 Rev.02 Conceptual SRS - Letdown Station
	PFD	0418E30SD10 Rev.02 SIL verification assessment & report - Letdown Station (Detailed Report)
	PFD	0418E30SD10-1 Rev.02 SIL verification report - Letdown Station (Short Report)

	3	FMEDA assessment for Actuator-Positioner-Valve arrangement
Actuator-Positioner-Valve arrangement
		Short description: An Actuator-Positioner-Valve (APV) arrangement shall be used as the “Final Safety Element” (FSE) in a “Safety Instrumented Function” (SIF). It is required to perform a FMEDA assessment to issue the APV arrangement “SIL Certificate”, to determine if this arrangement satisfies SIL-3 rating in hardware fault tolerance (HFT) 0 or 1 configuration.
	PDF	0418G25SD11 Rev.01 FMEDA Background
	PDF	0418G25SD12 Rev.01 FMEDA study report
	PDF	0418G25SD13 Rev.01 FMEDA assessment & report
	PFD	0418G25SD14 Rev.01 Actuator-Positioner-Valve Arrangement “SIL_Certificate”